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Penal Code § 11160.1 (new).
AB 998 (Chu); 2005 STAT. Ch. 133
I. INTRODUCTION
A rape victim opened a cold waiting room door. After enduring an exam, she
left the hospital and vowed to forget what her assailant did. The physician who
treated her called the police to report her identity, injuries, and location. The
physician followed the law.'
Later that night, police escorted the man suspected of violating the victim
through the same waiting room door. The same physician performed an exam,
but the police did not receive a call. Afraid he might violate the suspect's right of• 2
privacy, the physician refused to release the evidence from the exam. The
physician followed the law.3
Perhaps it was time for a new law.4
1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Law: HIPAA
In 1996, the United States Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA).5 HIPAA, the first federal legislation of its kind,
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 160(a)-(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (mandating a physician who knows
or reasonably suspects a patient was the victim of sexual abuse to notify police immediately and submit a
written report within two days). The phone call and report must contain the victim's name and known
whereabouts, the character and extent of injuries, and the identity of any person the victim alleged was the
assailant. Id.
2. See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 6
(Apr. 19, 2005) ("The enactment of the federal medical privacy act, HIPAA, has caused some California
hospitals to express concern about disclosing the results of rape suspect exams to law enforcement.") (quoting
Background Information Request Sheet, prepared by Daniel Felizzatto, L.A. Dist. Att'y's Office, for Assembly
Member Mark Leno, Chair, Assembly Comm. on Pub. Safety, Cal. State Assembly, at 2) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
3. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. See generally Memorandum from the L.A. Dist. Att'y's
Office, Appellate Div., to Curt Livesay, Chief Deputy Dist. Att'y, L.A. Dist. Att'y's Office (Dec. 2, 2004) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that rape suspect exams do not currently fall within one of
HIPAA's exceptions, thus a physician could face liability for releasing such information).
4. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Cooley, Dist. Att'y, by Daniel Felizzatto, Legis. Advocate, L.A. Dist.
Att'y's Office, to Cal. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, State of Cal. (July 18, 2005) [hereinafter Cooley
Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (emphasizing that Chapter 133 will apply the same
requirements to rape suspect exams as already apply to rape victim exams).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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is "a set of basic national privacy standards... [designed to] provide all
Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind that is essential to
their full participation in their care."6 Under HIPAA, the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) established regulations regarding the exchange of
health information. The regulations became effective in April 20038 and apply to
DHHS, health plans, and healthcare providers.9 HIPAA also imposes criminal
and civil liability on individuals who improperly handle or disclose protected
information.' Furthermore, because the Secretary of DHHS enforces HIPAA," a
patient whose rights are violated does not have a private right of action under
HIPAA.12 Accordingly, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a HIPAA
claim unless the Secretary of DHHS brings the claim. 3
While HIPAA is comprehensive, it created only a "framework of protection"
that subsequent state and federal legislation can strengthen." As a preemptive
act,'15 HIPAA established a minimum level of privacy protection and state
legislation can provide only greater privacy protection.' 6 Conversely, if any
federally imposed regulations are less stringent than a state law, the state law
applies.
Concisely stated, HIPAA prohibits the release of medical records unless a
physician (1) obtains a patient's written consent, 8 (2) gives a patient prior
notification with an opportunity to agree or object, or (3) comes within one of
HIPAA's exceptions codified in section 164.512 of volume 45 of the Code of1 ,20
Federal Regulations ("section 164.512"). In establishing various exceptions,
6. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82464
(Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.160, 164).
7. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation for a Federal Physician-
Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 510 (2004).
8. Memorandum from Lydia Bodin, Special Assistant, Bureau of Branch & Area Operations, L.A. Dist.
Att'y's Office, to Curt Livesay, Chief Deputy Dist. Att'y, L.A. Dist. Att'y's Office (Dec. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
Bodin Memorandum] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
9. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 11 (June 14, 2005).
10. Bodin Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 130d-5, d-6 (West 2000).
12. Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 100 (D.D.C. 2005).
13. Id.
14. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82464 (Dec. 28,
2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
15. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2004).
16. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMiTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 8 (June 2, 2005);
see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(6) (2004) (defining "more stringent" as a law that "provides greater privacy
protection for the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable health information").
17. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2 (West 2001) (directing the Secretary of DHHS to promulgate regulations
that do "not supersede a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes requirements,
standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent than" those by the federal government).
18. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2004).
19. Id.
20. See id. § 164.512(a)-(l) (detailing specific exceptions within the section's twelve broad categories:
(a) uses and disclosures required by law; (b) uses and disclosures for public health activities; (c) disclosures
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section 164.512 imposes additional requirements for some of the exceptions2' and
often involves interplay between federal regulations and state laws.2
The HIPAA exception most relevant to Chapter 133, section 164.512(a),
allows disclosures required by law:
(1) A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information to the
extent that such use or disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure
complies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of such law.
(2) A covered entity must meet the requirements described in paragraph
(c) [addressing disclosures about victims of abuse], (e) [addressing dis-
closures for judicial and administrative proceedings], or (f) [disclosures
for law enforcement purposes] of this section for uses or disclosures
required by law. 3
When applying this section to state law, there are two plausible interpretations.24
First, section 164.512(a)(1) could be read independently of section 164.512(a)(2);
thus, the additional requirements in paragraphs (c), (e), or (f) would be relevant
only when "the disclosure involves the particular topics covered by paragraphs
(c), (e), or (f)., 25 Alternatively, the two sections could be read together,
permitting state mandated disclosure only if such disclosure is encompassed in
paragraphs (c), (e), or (f).26 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio recently addressed the issue and read the sections
independently.27 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the commentary
accompanying HIPAA, which explains that "the phrase 'required by law' is
intended to be read broadly to include the full array of binding legal authority,
such as constitutions, statutes, rules, [and] regulations" and "was generally meant
not to interfere with, or add onto, the requirements of those other laws. 28 Thus,
about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence; (d) uses and disclosures for health oversight activities; (e)
disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings; (f) disclosures for law enforcement purposes; (g) uses
and disclosures about decedents; (h) uses and disclosures for cadaveric, organ, eye, or tissue donation purposes;
(i) uses and disclosures for research purposes; (j) uses and disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or
safety; (k) uses and disclosures for specialized government functions; and (1) disclosures for workers'
compensation).
21. See, e.g., id. § 164.512(f)(l)(C)(ii)(l)-(3) (explaining that an administrative agency's request for
information can seek only information that "is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry").
The request must be "specific and limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable" and cannot be satisfied
with de-identified information. Id.
22. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82668 (Dec. 28,
2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (noting that HIPAA's exceptions are intended to include federal,
state, and local laws).
23. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2004).
24. Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. Buckeye Ranch, 365 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
25. Id. at 889-90.
26. Id. at 889.
27. Id. at 889-90.
28. See id. (quoting Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82668 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160, 164)).
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the court broadly read section 164.512(a) to include state required disclosures
that were not explicit in paragraphs (c), (e), or (f).29
Section 164.512(f), which elaborates about disclosures for "law enforcement
purposes," is also relevant to Chapter 133 and included within the "required by
law" exception discussed above. 0 Per this exception, HIPAA allows the release
of information for law enforcement purposes if required by law.3 While each
state must determine what disclosures are required,32 HIPAA explicitly includes
certain situations, such as mandatory reporting of particular wounds33 and law
enforcement requests about suspected crime victims.34 Authorized releases can
also be made pursuant to court orders,35 grand jury subpoenas,36 and
administrative requests.37 Lastly, the exception does not encompass state-
authorized releases unless the release is mandatory.38
B. Obtaining Medical Information About Victims
Consistent with HIPAA's victim reporting exception, California Penal Code
section 11160 ("section 11160") requires healthcare providers to contact law
enforcement if the provider knows or reasonably suspects a patient is the victim
of a firearm wound or assaultive or abusive conduct.39 Section 11160 requires a
healthcare provider to report the victim's condition by telephone immediately, or
as soon as practically possible, and send a written report to law enforcement
within two days.n° The report must include the victim's name and known
whereabouts, the character and extent of the injury, and the identity of any person
alleged to be the attacker.4 ' Overall, the purpose of mandatory victim reporting is
to alert law enforcement of a crime that has been or is being committed. 2
29. Id.
30. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(0(1) (2004).
31. Id.
32. Bodin Memorandum, supra note 8, at 1.
33. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2004).
34. Id. § 164.512(f)(3).
35. Id. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A).
36. Id. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(B).
37. Id. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C).
38. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82688 (Dec.
28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (explaining that releases a state does not believe are necessary to
achieve a public policy purpose do not reflect a strong enough interest to "override the Congressional goal of
protecting privacy rights").
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); see also id. § 11160(d) (defining
assaultive or abusive conduct).
40. Id. § I I160(b)(1)-(2).
41. Id.§ 11160(b)(4).
42. SENATE COMMIrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 10 (June 14, 2005).
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C. Obtaining Medical Information About Suspects
1. Extent of Fourth Amendment Protection
Once a suspect is in custody, law enforcement may note or photograph any
visible physical evidence without violating a suspect's Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 43 Furthermore, if a suspect is
under arrest, warrantless intrusions of the suspect's body are constitutional in a
limited range of circumstances, particularly if the evidence might be lost in the
time it would take to obtain a warrant." For example, the United States Supreme
Court held that law enforcement did not violate an arrested drunk driver's Fourth
Amendment rights when they directed physicians to extract his blood to
determine his blood alcohol level. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized that a delay in obtaining a search warrant threatened to destroy such
46evidence.
After arresting a rape suspect, police usually perform what is known as a
rape suspect exam.47 Based on the lawful arrest and the need to obtain evidence
that could be destroyed, police are constitutionally permitted to perform the
search without obtaining a warrant. Generally, a rape suspect exam involves
shaking down the suspect's clothing, looking for any scratches, ripped clothing,
signs of struggle, or noticeable marks, and swabbing the suspect's genitals.49
Evidence obtained from the exam can exculpate the suspect, locate the victim's
DNA on the suspect, identify the suspect's DNA on the victim," corroborate the
victim's testimony, such as identifying places the victim allegedly scratched the
suspect, and provide other vital trace and non-trace evidence.5' As rape suspect
exams attempt to find evidence created during an alleged rape, their usefulness
diminishes with time because the evidence can often be destroyed 2 Thus, it is
within a police department's discretion to perform a rape suspect exam.53
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
46. Id. at 770.
47. SENATE COMMrITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 8 (June 14, 2005).
48. Id. (noting that rape suspect exams are considered lawful searches as long as there is probable cause
for arrest).
49. Telephone Interview with Lydia Bodin, Assistant Head Deputy, L.A. Dist. Att'y's Office, Sex
Crimes Div. [hereinafter Bodin Interview] (July 28, 2005) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
50. See id. (explaining that the victim's DNA on places such as the suspect's genital region can be used





For searches that are not permissible incident to arrest, such as tests for
permanent diseases, law enforcement must obtain a warrant. 4 When granting
warrants for forensic medical exams, the California Supreme Court determined
that, after finding probable cause, the issuing authority must also apply a
balancing test to determine whether the character of the requested search is
appropriate to grant a warrant."5 On one hand, the issuing authority must consider
the medical method that will be used to obtain the evidence, the seriousness of
the underlying criminal offense, society's interest in obtaining a conviction, the
strength of law enforcement's suspicions that the evidence will be revealed
through the procedure, the importance of the evidence sought, and the possibility
that the evidence may be obtained by less intrusive means.56 Balanced against
these considerations, the issuing authority must weigh the severity of the
proposed intrusion and consider factors such as the procedure's intensity,
unusualness, length, uncomfortable results, safety, or undignified nature." The
California Supreme Court applied this balancing test in a case when the
defendant was charged with incest with his child. The court held that ordering an
extremely intrusive exam of the defendant's genital tract violated his Fourth
Amendment right because the intrusion was substantial, not routine, and obtained
only highly circumstantial and speculative evidence. 8
2. Inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment
Not only was extracting blood from an intoxicated driver consistent with the
Fourth Amendment in Schmerber v. California, the United States Supreme Court
also held that the Fifth Amendment permitted the procedure. 9 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court explained that the procedure did not violate the suspect's
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the blood evidence
was not testimonial in nature.60 The Court explained that "[s]ince the blood test
evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither [the
suspect's] testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing
by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible based on the Fifth Amendment.
' 6'
Accordingly, Fifth Amendment protections are inapplicable to rape suspect
62exams.
54. Id.
55. People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 293-94, 578 P.2d 123, 127-28 (1978).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 294-95.
59. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
60. Id. at 764-65.
61. Id.
62. SENATE COMMITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 8 (June 2, 2005).
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3. Obtaining the Results
Many counties, including Los Angeles and Kern, contract with local
hospitals to perform rape suspect exams.63 Before HIPAA, hospitals routinely
disclosed the results of these exams.' Based on concerns about civil or criminal
liability, however, some hospitals refused to release the results after Congress
enacted HIPAA.65 On the other hand, some counties, such as Sacramento, do not
contract with local hospitals for rape suspect exams.66 Instead, these counties
have police department sexual assault nurse examiners or the county crime lab
perform the exam.6 7 Thus, post-HIPAA release of suspect records was only a
problem for some of the counties that did not perform in-house exams.6"
III. CHAPTER 133
The California Legislature enacted Chapter 133 to clarify the confusion
HIPAA caused. 69 Specifically, because HIPAA made some medical facilities
hesitant to release rape suspects' forensic exam records, Chapter 133 clarifies
that not only are medical facilities allowed to release the records to law
enforcement, but that such release is mandatory. To accomplish its purpose,
Chapter 133 added section 11160.1 (a)-(f) to the California Penal Code.
Overall, Chapter 133 requires "any practitioner employed in any health
facility, clinic, physician's office, local or state public health department, or a
clinic or other type of facility operated by a local or state health department"
("hospitals") to prepare and release a written report of any forensic medical exam
performed on a person in law enforcement custody7' for sexual assault charges or
72a sexual assault investigation.
63. Bodin Interview, supra note 49; Telephone Interview by Gina Nargie, Dist. Att'y Sacramento
County Dist. Att'y's Office, with Chris Jackson, Detective, Shafter Police, Kern County (Aug. 17, 2005)
[hereinafter Jackson Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
64. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 6 (Apr. 19,
2005).
65. Id. But see Jackson Interview, supra note 63 (indicating that hospitals in Kern County routinely
release rape suspect exam records). See also Interview with Kimberly Horiuchi, Counsel, Assembly Comm. on
Pub. Safety, Cal. State Assembly, in Sacramento, Cal. (July 13, 2005) [hereinafter Horiuchi Interview] (notes
on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (suggesting Los Angeles County might have experienced the majority
of resistance from hospitals).
66. Interview with Gina Nargie, Dist. Att'y, Sacramento County Dist. Att'y's Office, in Sacramento,
Cal. (Aug. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Nargie Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 6 (Apr. 19,
2005).
70. Id. at 7.




Instead of listing the types of sexual assault charges that bring a suspect
within Chapter 133's provisions, the statute references the sexual assault crimes
listed in California Penal Code section 11160(d).73 While section 11160(d) also
lists non-sexual crimes, such as murder and mayhem, Chapter 133 applies only to
the sexual assault crimes.74 Thus, as listed in section 11160(d), the sexual assault
crimes Chapter 133 covers include (1) assault with intent to commit rape,
sodomy, or oral copulation, (2) sexual battery, (3) incest, (4) rape, (5) spousal
rape, (6) procuring any female to have sex with another man, (7) sodomy, (8)
lewd and lascivious acts with a child, (9) oral copulation, and (10) sexual
penetration.
Regarding the report, Chapter 133 requires the Office of Emergency
Services, or an agency the Director of Finance designates, to develop a standard
form.
7 6 Most importantly, such reports must include information obtained only
during the rape suspect exam because Chapter 133 does not mandate, or protect
physicians from liability for, releasing additional medical information about a
suspect. 7  Further, the practitioner is required to immediately release the report to
"any person or agency involved in any related investigation or prosecution of a
criminal case including, but not limited to, a law enforcement officer, district
attorney, city attorney, crime laboratory, county licensing agency, or coroner.""
The report can be released to defense counsel or another third party only through
discovery of the prosecutor's documents or a court order.79
Chapter 133 also clarifies that a hospital that releases a report, or a person
who takes photographs for the report, shall not incur criminal or civil liability for
doing so.'° Chapter 133 underscores, however, that it does not grant immunity
from civil or criminal liability for non-authorized use of exam photographs.8'
Furthermore, Chapter 133 emphasizes that the medical exam and report are
subject to the requirements of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act,87
the physician-patient privilege, 3 and the privilege of official information. 4
73. Id.
74. Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65.
75. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 133) (referring to CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11160 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005)).
76. See id. (providing that the Director of Finance may designate an agency pursuant to section 13820).
77. See Cooley Letter, supra note 4 ("[Chapter 133] does not seek to require rape suspects' general
medical records to be released. The records that [Chapter 133] seeks to have released are only those that relate
to lawful searches.").
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160.1 (c) (enacted by Chapter 133).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 11160.1(d).
81. Id.
82. See id. § 11160.1(b) (subjecting Chapter 133 to the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act,
which commences at CAL. CIVIL CODE § 56 (West 1982)).
83. See id. (subjecting Chapter 133 to Article 6 (commencing with CAL. EVID. CODE § 990 (West
1995)). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 998 (West 1995) (establishing that California does not recognize the
physician-patient privilege in criminal proceedings).
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Chapter 133 also provides that a hospital cannot be required to perform
forensic medical examinations unless that hospital has entered into a contractual
agreement with law enforcement." Still, once a non-contracted hospital performs
a forensic exam, the records can be subpoenaed. Consequently, Chapter 133
allows a hospital to decline to perform a forensic exam, but not to decline to
release records if an exam is performed 6 Lastly, California Penal Code section
11162, which provides that a violation of mandatory reporting laws is a• 87
misdemeanor, does not apply to Chapter 133.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 133
Although Chapter 133's author believed HIPAA did not prohibit the release
of rape suspect exams, 8  hospitals were not convinced that HIPAA permitted
these releases. 9 While hospitals' refusals to perform and release the results of
exams were troubling to law enforcement and prosecutors, the hospitals' fears
were understandable. 9° As one reporter explained, "hospitals have much to lose
and nothing to gain by providing information without being ordered to do so,
even in cases where it is ultimately in the patient's best interests." 9' Specifically,
physicians face $50,000 in fines and up to one year in jail for improperly
releasing medical information.92 Thus, even if a physician wanted to release exam
records to assist a rape investigation, the physician must balance this desire
against the risk of personal liability.9 Overall, although Chapter 133 cannot
compel a non-contracted hospital to perform a rape suspect exam, 94 it should
84. See CAL PENAL CODE § 11160.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 133) (subjecting Chapter 133 to CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1040 (West 1995)); see also CAL. EvrD. CODE § 1040 (West 1995) (stating that official information is
information not previously disclosed to the public and "acquired in confidence by a public employee in the
course of' his or her duty, and declaring that such information is privileged and disclosure is forbidden by state
or federal law or if against the public interest). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(c) (West 1995) (requiring the
Employment Development Department to disclose to law enforcement information about any person for whom
a felony arrest warrant has been issued).
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160.1 (f) (enacted by Chapter 133).
86. Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65.
87. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (West 2000) (establishing that a violation of Article 2 of the
California Penal Code is a misdemeanor and is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six months, a fine
not exceeding $1,000, or both).
88. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82688 (Dec.
28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65; Bodin Interview, supra note
49; see also infra text accompanying notes 105-08.
89. ASSEMBLY COMMIT1EE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 6 (Apr. 19,
2005).
90. Farah Stockman, Patient Privacy Laws Seen as Barrier to Law Enforcement, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
4, 2003, at B12 (quoting Memorandum from Benjamin Klafter to James Provenza, infra note 92).
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from Benjamin Klafter to James Provenza (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (regarding proposed legislation to expand HIPAA mandated reporting).
93. Stockman, supra note 90.
94. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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ensure that law enforcement has access to exam records and that hospitals will
not fear or face liability under federal or state law.
To release a rape suspect's exam records without violating HIPAA, the release
must come within one of HIPAA's exceptions. 95 As Chapter 133 requires hospitals to
release the results of rape suspect exams, the California Legislature brought such
disclosures within the "required by law" exception.96 Further, as section 164.512(a),
the "required by law" exception, extends to "use" of the disclosed information,
Chapter 133 allows others in law enforcement, such as prosecutors, to use the records
without HIPAA violations.97 Section 164.512(a)(2), which implicates section
164.512(f), is also relevant because Chapter 133 disclosures are for a "law
enforcement purpose" as they are used to collect evidence to investigate and possibly
prosecute rape suspects.5
Still, the Secretary of DHHS, or a hospital responding to a subpoena for
nondisclosure, could argue that a Chapter 133 disclosure does not come within or
was not intended to come within this exception.99 For example, by framing the
issue as one of statutory construction, one could argue that rape suspect exams
are not disclosed for a "law enforcement purpose;" however, this argument has
little merit or supporting authority.'" Moreover, even if rape suspect exam
disclosures are not considered disclosures for a "law enforcement purpose," the
recent Ohio District Court opinion would support allowing the disclosure under
section 164.512(a)(1) alone.'°1 A stronger argument lies with interpreting section
164.512(f)(1)(i), which allows disclosures required by law, "including laws that
require reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries .... "'02
Based on the explicit reference to physical injuries, an argument could be made
that the Legislature intended the mandatory reporting laws to include only
injuries to possible victims, so as to alert law enforcement that a crime may have
occurred. In this sense, the exception would not apply to a rape suspect exam
because law enforcement is already aware that a crime has allegedly occurred.
Accordingly, a policy in favor of identifying current victims through mandatory
victim reporting is not as strong when law enforcement has identified a victim
and is investigating a suspect.
95. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)-(1) (2004); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82668 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); see also supra text
accompanying notes 20-23.
96. Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65.
97. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2004).
98. Bodin Interview, supra note 49.
99. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 998, at 9-10 (Apr. 19,
2005); Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65.
100. See Bodin Interview, supra note 49 (concluding that rape suspect exams are clearly performed for
law enforcement purposes).
101. Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889-90 (S.D. Ohio 2005);
see also supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
102. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2004).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
On the other hand, this argument is not consistent with the plain language of
HIPAA or the commentary about it. First, while DHHS stated that mandatory
reporting would include reporting of possible victims, it did not include this
example to the exclusion of others."' Second, by declining to create an exclusive
list of permissible mandatory reporting, the authors of HIPAA presumably left
such determinations to a state's discretion, so long as other constitutional
limitations are not violated. °4 Lastly, as the Ohio District Court highlighted in its
interpretation of section 164.512(a), HIPPA was "intended to be read broadly to
include the full array of binding legal authority... encompass[ing] federal, state,
and/or local actions with legally binding effect."'' 5 Still, if the federal government
disagrees with this interpretation, or a hospital refuses to release rape suspect
exam records, a court could be forced to interpret section 164.512(f) and
determine whether it encompasses Chapter 133.
6
Alternatively, a court would not have to address section 164.512(f) if HIPAA
does not apply to Chapter 133.0 Chapter 133's author, Lydia Bodin, Assistant Head
Deputy of the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office Sex Crimes Division,
explained that HIPAA protection might not apply because, unlike a medical exam of
a patient, a rape suspect exam is a constitutional forensic exam of a suspect who is in
custody and subject to search.10 8 While it is plausible to distinguish a constitutionally
permissible forensic exam from a medical exam, it is questionable if such a
distinction would preclude HIPAA protection. Specifically, HIPAA protects
"individually identifiable health information, ' °9 which appears broad enough to
protect an individual's health information, even if it was collected as evidence in a
forensic exam. Moreover, if HIPAA does not apply to information obtained in a
forensic exam, the DHHS probably would not have included exemptions for such
information. For example, section 164.512(f) exempts disclosures made pursuant to a
court order, such as a warrant."0 Still, it could be argued that exemptions based on a
warrant refer to medical records obtained while the suspect was a patient, thus do not
apply to records from a forensic exam.
Despite the possible ambiguity regarding the interplay between Chapter 133
and HIPAA, it is questionable whether the issue will result in litigation. First,
because courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a private HIPAA claim,"' the
103. See id. § 164.512(f) (stating "[als required by law including laws that require the reporting of
certain types of wounds or other physical injuries" (emphasis added)).
104. Ohio Legal Rights Serv., 365 F. Supp. 2d at 889-90; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
105. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82668 (Dec.
28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
106. Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65.
107. Bodin Interview, supra note 49.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000).
110. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A) (2004).
111. Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 100 (D.D.C. 2005); see also supra text accompanying
notes 12-13.
2006 / Penal
party who arguably has the greatest motivation to bring a lawsuit lacks the
opportunity to do so. Second, while some hospitals might remain hesitant to
release rape suspect exams, Chapter 133 allows law enforcement to subpoena the
records, thus bringing the release within another HIPAA exception." ' Further,
while the federal government may bring an action, the commentary regarding
HIPAA expresses the intent not to supersede state laws."3 Lastly, even though
there are varying arguments as to the interplay between Chapter 133 and HIPAA,
each potentially allows the two to coexist;" 4 thus, the incentive to invest in a legal
battle without a stronger argument for a HIPAA violation is weak.
Furthermore, Chapter 133 affects only a small class of rape suspects and
investigations." 5 Specifically, Chapter 133 applies only to exams when an arrest
is made soon enough to justify a warrantless search." 6 Thus, law enforcement
must believe that evidence, such as the victim's DNA, scratches, or torn clothing,
will be destroyed if additional time passes."7 On the other hand, if a warrantless
search is not justified and law enforcement obtains a warrant, Chapter 133 does
not apply because HIPAA and state law already exempt hospitals from liability
for disclosures made pursuant to a court order. ' Additionally, because Chapter
133 applies only to hospitals that have already performed the exam or are
contracted to perform the exam, non-contracted hospitals may initially refuse to
perform exams to avoid having to disclose records.' 9
Possibly the strongest criticism of Chapter 133 is that it is not the only way to
solve the obstacles law enforcement face. ° Specifically, counties that use in-house
sexual assault nurse examiners or county crime labs to perform rape suspect exams
do not need Chapter 133's protections.' Still, without comparative research, it is
only possible to speculate as to which method is the most efficient and reliable.
Thus, it is uncertain if counties experiencing resistance from hospitals could have
pursued alternative methods before pursuing legislation.
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160.1(f) (enacted by Chapter 133); see also supra text accompanying note
85; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2004) (exempting disclosures made pursuant to a "court order or court-
ordered warrant").
113. Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889-90 (S.D. Ohio 2005);
see also supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
114. Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65; Bodin Interview, supra note 49; Ohio Legal Rights. Serv., 365
F. Supp. 2d at 899-90; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(1) (2004); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82668 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); see also supra
text accompanying notes 99-105.
115. Bodin Interview, supra note 49.
116. Id.
117. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding a warrantless search is permissible
when the evidence would be lost due to delays caused by getting a warrant).
118. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(l)(ii)(A) (2004).
119. Horiuchi Interview, supra note 65.
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accompanying notes 65-67.
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V. CONCLUSION
As a bill protecting victims, Chapter 133 is a fairly uncontroversial effort to
decrease rape suspects' privacy rights. The loss of privacy protections that
previously existed is justifiable as an effort to align disclosure of suspects' exam
records with those of victims.'22 Possibly for this reason, in its final version,
Chapter 133 received no registered opposition or votes against it.
If, however, section 164.512(a) is read to exempt from HIPAA any mandated
disclosures, states are essentially empowered to override all protection HIPAA
created. Thus, while it seems Chapter 133 successfully, and arguably justifiably,
"wrote in" a new exception in California, there is likely a line beyond which the
federal government will not allow a state to venture. Where this line is, and if it
will be tested, is yet to be disclosed.
122. See Background Information Request Sheet, prepared by Daniel Felizzatto, L.A. Dist. Att'y's
Office, for Assembly Member Mark Leno, Chair, Assembly Comm. on Pub. Safety, Cal. State Assembly, at 2
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (advocating that Chapter 133 "align[s] the treatment and disclosure of
both rape victims' and rape suspects' exams").
